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Abstract  —  In  a  modern  industrial  environment  control
programs are distributed among several devices. This raises new
issues and challenges especially in failure modes. Building fault
tolerant applications can be the solution in order a failure of one
sub-component  not  to  jeopardize  the  execution  of  the  whole
application. The authors have proposed a framework to support
replicated IEC 61499 applications. In this paper we augment this
framework  with  the  support  for  different  voting  strategies,
propose an extension of the replication communication protocol,
and  analyse  the  resulting  fault-tolerance  semantics.  A  limited
implementation of the framework is also described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The IEC 61499 [1]  standard introduces a new paradigm
where a single distributed control application may be built to
automate  the  entire  process,  but  its  execution  is  distributed
amongst  the  several  execution  devices.  The  main  novelty
brought  by  this  standard  is  an  event  driven  execution
approach,  which  provides  the  synchronisation  primitives
between  the  sub-applications  that  compose  the  distributed
control  application.  However,  in  a  distributed  environment
partial failures during the execution of the program may occur,
and  the  developer  must  take  into  consideration  how  the
application  will  react  when these  partial  failures  happen.  A
typical  approach  to  overcome  these  failures  is  based  on
building  fault  tolerant  applications  that  exploit  redundancy,
where the failure of one sub-component will be masked by the
continued execution of its redundant partner.
The  authors  have  defined  a  framework  that supports
tolerating  partial  failures  of  a  distributed  IEC  61499
application. This framework takes special care in guaranteeing
that all replicas are kept with the same synchronized internal
state, so that changing from one replica to another does not
impact the remainder of the distributed application [2].
The IEC 61499 standard is summarized in section II of this
paper,  where an updated version of the previously proposed
replication framework is also presented. Section III  explains
the  communication  protocol  used  to  support  the  replication
framework,  and  section  IV  discusses  the  resulting  fault-
tolerance  semantics  that  can  be  obtained.  In  Section  V  a
slightly modified version of the protocol is presented and its
advantages  are  discussed.  An  example  application  and  an
initial  implementation of  the proposed  framework  based  on
the FORTE [3] IEC 61499 execution environment is given in
section VI. Section VII gives a brief reference to related work,
and conclusions are presented in Section VIII.
II. IEC 61499 AND REPLICATION FRAMEWORK
IEC 61499 defines the syntax of a graphical programming
language, as well as the semantics of the platforms required to
execute programs written in this language.  Applications (the
name given  to  programs in IEC 61499) are  composed by a
network of Function Blocks (FBs) which exchange data and
events through separate data and event connections. A FB is
only activated when it receives an input event, upon which it
will  sample  its  data  inputs,  executes  its  internal  algorithms,
update its data outputs, and eventually emit one or more output
events. The semantics of IEC 61499 applications may therefore
be described as event based.
Each FB may itself be constituted by another internal FB
network,  whose  evaluation  follows  the  same  rules  as  the
evaluation of an applications' FB network – these are known as
composite FBs. The hierarchical levels of FBs based on other
FBs is not limited by the standard, however there comes a time
when the desired algorithm can no longer be expressed using a
FB network. In this case a basic FB is used, where the internal
algorithms  are  expressed  using  any  other  programming
language (e.g.:  Java, C, IEC 61131-3 languages,  etc.).  Basic
FBs also contain an internal state machine (known as the ECC
– Execution Control Chart) whose state transitions may depend
on the receipt of input events, or the state of an input, output or
internal variable. The activation of a state can be configured to
trigger  a  single  execution  of  one  of  more  of  the  internal
algorithms, as well as the triggering of an output event. The
data outputs are changed by the execution of the algorithms.
An  application  (a  graphical  network  of  FBs)  may  be
executed  within  a  single execution  device  (basically  any
computer that implements the IEC 61499 execution semantics).
In spite of this, the main advantage of IEC 61499 is to allow
applications to be distributed amongst several devices, as long
as  each  basic  or  composite  FB  is  allocated  inside  a  single
device.  Execution  devices  must  be  connected  to  a  common
data  communication  network  which  is  used  to  transfer  the
events and data between the FBs residing on distinct devices.
This  exchange  of  data  and  events  is  not  automatic  –  the
programmer  or  application  installer  is  required  to  manually
insert special  communication FBs (known as communication
Service Interface FBs – SIFBs) at both ends of every data or
event connection that  has to traverse a data communication.
The IEC 61499 standard defines a standard interface for these
SIFBs,  covering  both  the  publish/subscribe  and  the
client/server interaction models. Different implementations of
each  interface  are  allowed,  therefore  supporting  distinct
communication protocols as well as physical networks.
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We exploit this last facet of the IEC 61499 design to create
a  framework  to  support  the  replication  of  IEC  61499
applications.  This  framework  is  based  on providing specific
implementations of these communication SIFBs that take into
account the existence of FB replicas. Note that our architecture
for replicated IEC 61499 applications allows that these only be
partially replicated.  We expect that the application designers
will choose to replicate only those FBs whose execution have a
higher impact on the safety of the overall system, or those FBs
executing on devices with a higher failure probability.
Several versions of the replica supporting communication
SIFBs  are  required,  depending  on  whether  the  sender,  the
receiver, or both are from/to replicated FBs. Fig. 1 provides a
visual description of the several possibilities, whereas Fig. 2
highlights the distinct versions of the communication SIFBs
that are required to support replication. 
For  scenario  1  (Fig.  1),  standard  communication  SIFBs
that do not support replication may be used. For scenario 2 we
provide  a  set  of  publish/subscribe  communication  SIFBs
whose  implementation  implicitly  assumes  the  one-to-many
scenario.  For  scenario  5  we  also  provide  a  set  of
publish/subscribe communication SIFBs, where the subscriber
FB  expects  to  receive  a  message  from  each  replica  before
sending  out  the  data  from  both  messages  simultaneously.
Several versions of the subscribe FB are needed as the number
of  data  outputs  must  match  the  number  of  replicas  –  one
version for a specific number of replicas. This scenario also
requires  the  use  of  a  voting  FB,  that  will  consolidate  both
outputs into a single value.  Unlike previous versions of our
replication  framework,  by  separating  the  voter  from  the
subscriber  it  now becomes possible to have different  voting
strategies  implemented in distinct  voting FBs,  and therefore
allow the application designer the choice of which voter to use
for  each  specific  situation  (e.g.,  majority  voting,  median
voting, average voting, etc.).
Scenario  4 uses  a  mixture  of  FBs  already  provided  for
scenarios 2 and 5. We re-use the publishers from the one-to-
many  publish/subscribe  pairs,  and  the  subscribers  from the
many-to-one pairs. The voter FBs are also the same as those
used for scenario 5.
III. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
In  the  described  replication  framework  the  correct
execution of the replicated IEC 61499 application depends on
maintaining synchronised the internal state of all replicas of the
same FB. If this were not the case, in a non-failure situation
each replica would send distinct output data for the same input
event making it impossible to correctly determine what should
be the value of the consolidated output to be generated by the
voting FBs.
Replicas  may  become  de-synchronised  when  the
communication delays are not identical between all replicas,
or  the  time  to  execute  a  replica  differs  between  execution
devices.  The  most  simple  situation  occurs  when  a  FB  A
receives  data/events  from  two  FBs  B  and  C.  If  FB  A  is
replicated (two replicas A1 and A2), then it becomes plausible
that two events sent out by FBs B and C may arrive in one
order at  replica A1, and in the inverse order  at  replica A2.
Depending on the internal algorithms in FB A, the processing
of the input data/events in the reverse order may lead to the
replicas A1 and A2 becoming de-synchronised.
To maintain all replicas with the same internal state (i.e.,
replica  synchronism)  we  must  therefore  guarantee  that  all
messages are processed in the same order in all replicas, and
that  the  algorithms executed  by all  replicated  FBs  must  be
deterministic  (for  example,  may  not  depend  on  reading  a
random  value).  To  achieve  this  we  have  implemented  the
timed messages protocol [4] on the communication SIFBs for
all scenarios 2, 4 and 5.
The  publish  FBs  all  add  an  extra  time-stamp to  every
message  that  is  sent,  representing  the  time  at  which  the
message should be accepted and processed by the subscriber.
This  time-stamp is determined by adding a fixed offset to the
time  at  which  the  message  is  being  sent.  The  fixed  (per
publisher) offset is determined off-line as a ceiling of the worst
case transmission time of the message to each replica.
When a  scenario  2  subscriber  FB  receives  a  message  it
stores  the  message  until  the  current  time matches  the  time-
stamp  of  the  message  itself,  at  which  time  the  message  is
processed and events/data are sent onwards. Messages arriving
at  a  time  later  than  their  time-stamp  are  simply  discarded.
Assuming  that  all  execution  devices  maintain  synchronised
clocks, we can guarantee that all messages are processed in the
same order. For messages that happen to have the exact sameFig. 1. Data/Event passing scenarios.
Fig. 2. Communication SIFBs and voting FBs used in each Data/Event passing scenario.
time-stamp, a second parameter is used to break the tie (in our
case, the network address of the sender).
Similarly, when a scenario 5 subscriber receives a message,
it will store that message until the clock reaches the value in
the time-stamp. At this time all messages with the same time-
stamp are collected, and their outputs placed on the FBs output
to be voted upon by the subsequent voting FB. 
The pairing  of  received  messages  based  on time-stamps
will only work if both replicas send the message with the exact
same  time-stamp.  For  this  reason,  publishers  of  scenario  5
cannot use the local time to generate the time-stamp as there is
no guarantee that both replicas will execute at the exact same
instant. In this case the time-stamp is determined by adding a
fixed offset to the time-stamp of the message that arrived at
the subscriber FB at the beginning of the FB network, and that
started the execution of the event sequence. This source event
may be substantially distant from the publishing FB, and may
have  gone  through  several  intermediary  FBs  (scenario  4 in
Fig.  1).  Passing  the  time-stamp  information  along with  the
internal events therefore requires an extension to IEC 61499.
IV. TOLERATED FAULT MODELS
Assuming  that  no  faults  occur  on  the  communication
networks, the fault models and the number of faults that can
be tolerated will depend on the voting algorithms in use.  
When  using  non-majority  voters  that  generate  an  output
event  after  receiving  a  single  valid  message  (i.e.,  that  is
received  before  the  valid  time  expires),  then  only  fail-stop
faults  in  the  execution  devices  are  tolerated.  This  is  the
situation  where  a  faulty  device  simply  stops  executing  and
therefore also abstains from sending any new requests. With
this  voting  algorithm more  complex  fault  models  cannot  be
masked. Consider for example the failure mode in which an
execution device stops receiving all messages, but is still able
to  send  out  messages.  A  replica  running  on  this  execution
device may become de-synchronised with all other replicas as
soon as the remaining replicas receive an input message. The
de-synchronised replica may however still generate messages if
the replicated algorithm contains a local source of events (e.g.,
periodic timer). In this case the voting algorithm will receive a
single  message  from  this  failed  replica,  which  will  be
incorrectly passed onwards as if it were correct. 
When voting uses a majority based algorithm then failed
execution devices do not need to become silent - any messages
generated by failed devices  will  be ignored by the voter  as
long as they are a minority. 
Note  that  execution  devices  may  also  control  physical
outputs to which actuators are connected. In order to tolerate
faults  in  the  execution  devices  each  actuator  must  be
controllable by more than one execution device, in which case
several physical outputs (one from each execution device) will
be connected to the same actuator. These outputs must also be
voted  upon,  following  whatever  voting  algorithm  may  be
considered  appropriate  for  the  application.  Reliable  voting
algorithms (e.g., at least one) can easily be built using relays in
series  or  parallel.  Majority  voting  based  on  relays  requires
circuits that grow exponentially with the number of replicas.
In summary, when using n replicas, the number of faults
that  may be  tolerated  may be  n-1  when using  the  fail-stop
failure  model  together  with 1 out  of  n  voting.  When using
more permissive fault  models and majority voting,  then the
number of faults that can be tolerated reduces to floor((n-1)/2).
V. AUGMENTED COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
The proposed framework is also sufficient to tolerate faults
in the communication network itself  – in fact, many network
faults are equivalent to a fault in the execution device affected
by  the  network  fault.  For  example,  when a  node  becomes
permanently disconnected from the network it will behave as if
it had a fail-stop fault. An intermittent fault in the network that
results  in  a  replica  not  receiving  a  message  will  make  this
replica's internal state  become  de-synchronised, and therefore
all output messages will be voted out by subsequent voters  in
the case that majority voting is being used.
However,  in  this  last  case  it  is  possible  to  augment  the
communication  protocol  so  that  incorrect  internal  state  is
detected by the replica itself. This is done by adding a unique
identifier  to  each  message  based  on  a  counter  that  is
incremented for each consecutive message sent by each FB.
When a message arrives at a replica, that replica will be able to
independently determine whether any previous messages have
failed to be delivered to itself, and in this case will take itself
out of commission (basically stop sending output messages).
If  this mechanism is used,  and if the replicated  FB only
sends  out  messages  (event  or  data)  as  a  consequence  of
receiving an input message (event or data), then the replica will
behave  according  to  the  fail-stop  model.  Notice  that  if  the
replicated FB contains an internal event source, or if it handles
input  events  from  physically  connected  inputs,  then  the
previous conditions are not met. For example, if a FB contains
an  internal  source  of  periodic  events,  then  it  may  generate
output events without having received any input message. In
this case one replica may miss the receipt of a message, and
before it can detect this failure (by the receipt of the subsequent
message skipping an identifier) the internal event source fires
and an erroneous output message is sent. The same argument
applies if the event source comes from a physically connected
input – the physical inputs may be viewed as an out-of-band
communication channel between the replicas.
If  the  above  conditions  are  met,  using  this  mechanism
together with the use of the simpler 'one out of n' voting, a
higher  number  of  faults  may  be  tolerated  using  the  same
number of replicas. Note however that the higher number of
tolerated  faults  is  in  the  network  itself,  and  not  in  the
execution devices  – the execution devices  must be working
correctly to detect that it has reached an inconsistent internal
state, and therefore stop sending output messages.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION - TEST APPLICATION
We have implemented this framework on FORTE, an open
source  IEC  61499  execution  environment  which  runs  as  a
virtual  machine  executing  IEC  61499  applications.  Each
instance  of  this  virtual  machine  is  therefore  an  execution
device from the point of view of an IEC 61499 application,
and  in  real-world  use  are  expected  to  run  on  distinct
computing  hardware.  FORTE  is  developed  in  conjunction
with 4DIAC, a graphical  development  environment for  IEC
61499 applications.
Our sample replication framework has been developed as
an extension of the communication SIFBs in FORTE. Since
FORTE implements the communication SIFBs using a layered
architecture,  what  we  actually  implemented  were  two  new
layers  –  one  for  one-to-many replication,  and  the  other  for
many-to-one. We have also augmented  the code in FORTE
that  handles  the  transmission  of  events  inside  the  FORTE
virtual  machine,  so  that  the  time-stamp  is  implicitly
transferred from the first subscriber in a replica, to the final
publisher of that same replica. As explained previously, this is
required  so  that  all  messages  arriving  at  the  many-to-one
subscriber can be grouped together.
Some simple tests were run based on the trivial  XPlus3
sample application that comes with the 4DIAC development
environment. The objective of these tests is only to make an
an  initial  validation  of  the  implementation.  The  original
sample  application  (read  input,  add  3,  print  result)
simultaneously  uses  the  FORTE  and  FBDK  [3]  execution
environments.  Using  the  new  replication  layers  a  trivial
replicated version of this application has been tested, where
the  Add  FB  is  now  replicated.  This  trivial  replicated
application was successfully tested with all device instances
running on the same computer. Device failures were tested by
simply stopping and starting each of the devices running one
of  the  replicas.  The  results  were  as  expected,  where  the
application was able to produce an output result as long as at
least one of the replica devices were executing.
Future tests of the replication framework will be run using
conveyors  whose  I/O  is  accessible  over  Modbus/TCP.  The
Modbus servers in the conveyors will be used as voters for the
physical outputs.
VII. RELATED WORK
To  the  authors'  knowledge,  little  work  has  been  done
regarding  the  use  of  fault  tolerance  in  the  context  of  IEC
61499 applications. However, somewhat related is the use of
IEC  61499  in  safety  critical  applications  -  [5]  applies
formalisms  to  model  and  validate  IEC  61499  applications.
Although not in the context of safety-critical application, a lot
of  work  has  been  done  on  formalising  the  IEC  61499
execution  semantics  [6-7].  Other  somewhat  related  work
focuses  on  online  reconfiguration  of  IEC  61499  control
applications, while guaranteeing the control application's real-
time requirements [8-10].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
As was  stated  in  the  introduction,  our  work  focuses  on
providing  support  for  tolerating  partial  failures  of  the
execution control devices. At first we only considered that the
execution devices would follow the fault-stop fault model. In
this paper we explore the changes required to the framework
to support the fault-silent fault model in the execution devices,
as well as intermittent failures of the communication network
itself.  We do not yet  consider how faulty execution devices
that have been repaired may be brought back into the running
application  without  rebooting  the  application  itself,  as  this
requires  that  these  devices  be  somehow  reloaded  with  the
current internal state of a working replica. Although we have
not yet focused our attention to this issue, we currently believe
that  the  result  of  previous  work  regarding  the  on-line
reconfiguration  of  IEC  61499  applications  is  likely  to  be
applicable to this scenario.
In this paper we have also provided an updated version of
the  IEC  61499  framework,  that  supports  the  existence  of
several distinct voting algorithms from which the application
designer may choose from.
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